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VOLUME 3 FALL, 1964 NUMBER I
ANTITRUST LAWS AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN RELATION TO PATENTS
Raymond C. Nordhaus/
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review, first, basic antitrust,
misuse and other public policy considerations as they relate to
patents and patent agreements, and secondly, techniques and related
problems of correcting or purging illegal activities.
As a general proposition, if a patent owner is operating within the
scope of his patent right, he is protected in his activity. Conversely,
if he is operating outside of the scope of his patent right, his activity
is unprotected by the patent laws. In connection with unprotected
activity, a patent owner is confronted, not only with the antitrust
laws (see Appendix) but also with the patent misuse doctrine.'
Under this doctrine, a patent owner is barred from enforcing a license
agreement containing a restriction that is outside the scope of the
licensed patent. 2 A patent owner is also barred from obtaining relief
for either contributory or direct infringement of any patent that is
being used to support activity that is outside the scope of the patent
grant. 3 The judicial view underlying this doctrine is that the improper
*B.S. Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. John Marshall Law School.
Editor's Note: The author was formerly a trial attorney with the Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice. He is the co-author of PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW.
He has lectured extensively on the subjects of patents and antitrust law.
1. This doctrine evolved from the decision in Motion Pictures Patent Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), and its underlying theory was
outlined in detail in Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
2. Radio Corporation of America v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1928).
3. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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and unprotected activity serves to extend unjustly the scope of the
limited patent monopoly. The misuse doctrine has been considered
applicable to such diverse activities as those relating to tie-ins,4 price
fixing, 5 exclusive dealerships, 6 intentional patent mismarking,7 re-
strictions on the use of competitive products or processes,8 and dis-
criminatory pricing.9
An important, but unsettled question is whether every misuse of
a patent is a violation per se of the antitrust laws. From broad pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court,10 one might conclude that the
answer to this question is "Yes." However, the better view, and one
which is supported by the Attorney General's Committee that studied
the antitrust laws, is that every patent misuse is not automatically a
violation per se of the antitrust laws."
Many types of restrictions, limitations and conditions have appeared
in patent agreements. Typical provisions which will be examined
concern price, territory, quantity, style, customers, royalties, grant-
backs, and tying arrangements.
First, consideration will be given to these restrictions and limitations
as they may appear in manufacturing licenses.
With respect to price fixing, the Supreme Court held in the 1926
General Electric case1 2 that a licensor could properly exercise con-
trol over the price at which licensed articles were to be sold by its
manufacutring licensee. However, in subsequent decisions, 1 3 the
General Electric rule has been considerably circumscribed and at
4. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
5. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372 (D. N.J.
1952), affirmed, 237 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1956).
6. F. C. Russel Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., 194 F.2d 592 (7th Cir.
1952).
7. Surgitube Products Corp. v. Scholl Manufacturing Co., 158 F. Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
8. National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3rd
Cir. 1943).
9. Hardinge Company, Inc. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 164 F. Supp. 75
(W.D. Pa. 1958).
10. Mercoid Corporation v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944).
11. Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, p. 254.
12. United States v. General Electric Company, 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Also
see: United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) Para.
70714 (E.D. Mich. 1963); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964
Trade Cas.) Para. 71035 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
13. e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 304 (1948).
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present the status of price fixing by license agreement is uncertain.
It is doubtful that price fixing can be sustained except in the follow-
ing circumstances:
1. The licensor sells patented products in competition with
its licensee; 1 4
2. The price established by the licensor applies to patented
products only; 15
3. The licensor establishes and enforces the price inde-
pendently of its licensee; 1 6 and
4. Price control is exercised by the patent licensor over
one licensee only. 17
In the Gypsum case,' 8 which is illustrative of price fixing cases,
the Gypsum Company, owner of numerous patents relating to various
types of gypsum board and dominant in the industry, entered into
patent license agreements with its competitors each of whom knew
that other competitors were entering into substantially identical
agreements. Each licensee agreed to pay as royalty a stipulated per-
centage on the selling price of all plaster board and gypsum wallboard
of every kind whether or not made by patented processes or covered
by product claims, and further agreed not to sell patented wallboard
to manufacturing distributors unless the Gypsum Company gave its
consent as to each prospective purchaser. The Gypsum Company re-
served the right to fix the minimum price at which each licensee sold
wall board embodying the licensor's patents. Pursuant to this reserva-
tion, the Gypsum Company issued bulletins which defined in detail
both the prices and terms of sale for patented gypsum board and
adopted a basing point system of pricing. Discounts to jobbers were
eliminated by the Gypsum Company and the former were effectively
forced out of business. Licensees who sold plaster together with
patented board were required to sell plaster at prevailing prices and
not at any discount. To insure compliance with the price bulletins and
to receive complaints from licensees about violations of price bulletins,
the Gypsum Company established a wholly owned subsidiary named
14. United States v. Vehicular Parking, 54 F. Supp. 828, 838 (D. Del. 1944).
15. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400, 401
(1948).
16. United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1956),
affirmed per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
17. Tinnerman Products Inc. v. George K. Garrett Company, 185 F. Supp.
151 (E.D. Pa. 1960), corrected 188 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affirmed on other
grounds, 292 F.2d 137 (3rd Cir. 1961).
18. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), and
339 U.S. 959 (1950).
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Board Survey, Inc. The Gypsum Company and the licensees ceased
manufacturing unpatented gypsum board after the license agree-
ments were executed. In view of the foregoing, the government
charged that the Gypsum Company and its licensees had violated
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by a conspiracy to restrain
and monopolize interstate trade in gypsum products. Upon conclusion
of the government's case, the trial court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and the
Supreme Court affirmed.
Limitations relating to the territory in which a manufacturing li-
censee is authorized to practice a patented invention have been held
consistently by the courts to be within the patent laws. 1 9 In fact,
the Patent Code specifically provides that a party may "convey an ex-
clusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole
or any specified part of the United States." 2 0
In the Becton case, 2 1 wherein territorial restrictions were ap-
proved, American Stainless Steel Company, owner of United States
patents for an alloy producing so-called stainless steel, granted to
Cottrell & Co., of London, England, an exclusive license to import
into and sell in the United States hypodermic needle tubing made of
the patented alloy. Subsequently, Cottrell and the appellant entered
into a contract under which appellant was granted the right to sell
hypodermic needles made of the patented alloy throughout the West-
ern Hemisphere and Cottrell agreed to supply the appellant's entire
requirements for hypodermic tubing and not to supply hypodermic
needles or tubing for the manufacture of such needles to any other
person or concern in the Western Hemisphere (with certain excep-
tions). Appellee, a manufacturer of hypodermic needles, being unable
to obtain tubing of satisfactory hardness from United States mills,
sought, but was unable to obtain, tubing from Cottrell in England.
Appellee then brought suit charging that the contract between appel-
lant and Cottrell was an unreasonable restraint of trade and that
because of it appellant had an unlawful monopoly of the entire supply
of stainless steel tubing suitable for hypodermic needles in the United
States. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the contract in
question was within the scope of the patent monopoly and did not
offend the antitrust laws.
19. Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954);
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952).
21. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1936).
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In the area of quantity control, the courts have been quite liberal
in permitting a patent owner to impose, direct or indirect, production
limitations on the number of patented articles that the licensee may
make. 2
Style and customer restrictions, although sometimes grouped to-
gether and collectively referred to as field of operation or field of use
restrictions, will be discussed separately.
In the case of style restrictions, the courts have generally held it
permissible for a licensor to grant a limited license to use the patented
invention in making only specified styles of a product and to exact a
covenant from the licensee that it will not make any styles of the
patented product other than those licensed. 2 3 Basically, such a cove-
nant is merely an agreement by the licensee not to infringe upon the
licensed patent in unlicensed fields. Contrastingly, the courts have not
permitted licensors to exact a covenant from a licensee that he will not
make, use, or sell any product that is competitive to the licensed sub-
ject matter. This type of limitation, which concerns a licensee's
activity with devices not covered by the licensed patent, exceeds the
scope of the patent grant. Such restrictions have been held to be a
misuse of the licensed patent and illegal under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 24
Simple restrictions concerning the customers to whom the patent
licensee may sell patented devices have been treated by the courts as
being within the patent right. Thus, it has been held proper for a
licensor to restrict its licensee to selling patented devices solely to
customers who will use the patented device for certain described pur-
poses,2 5 to customers who will use or resell the patented device in a
specified territory,2 6 or to customers who are of a designated trade
classification. 27
22. United States v. E. I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 226
(D. Del. 1953), affirmed on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Q-Tips Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657 (D. N.J. 1951).
23. Campbell v. Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947); Atlas Imperial Diesel
Engine Co. v. Lanova Corporation, 79 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1948).
24. Berlenbach v. Anderson and Thompson Ski Co., Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
(1964 Trade Cas.) Para. 71057 (9th Cir. 1964); National Lockwasher Co. v.
George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1943); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 397 (1948).
25. General Talking Picture Corp. v. Western Electric Company, 304 U.S.
175 (1938).
26. Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Manufacturing Co., 7
Fed. Cas. 946 (No. 4015) (N.D.N.Y., 1874).
27. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Casco Products Company, 89 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.
1937).
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With respect to royalty conditions, it is generally permissible for
a licensor to use almost any base in the determination and computa-
tion of royalty payments. Thus, royalty payments may be measured
by the number of patented articles produced by the licensee, the
amount of raw materials used by the licensee in producing the
patented article or on a percentage of the licensee's total sales
whether including licensed inventions or not. 28 In the Automatic
Radio case, 29 the Supreme Court indicated that it is permissible to
exact royalties for the privilege of use, as well as for the actual use
of the patent right.
Whether a licensor can properly contract for the payment of
royalties beyond expiration of the licensed patent is at present un-
settled. In the Ar-Tik Systems case, 30 for example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that an agreement which required a licensee
to pay royalties for the use of a patented frozen dessert machine be-
yond the patent expiration date was illegal and unenforceable. The
Court of Appeals held, in effect, that royalty payments for the use of
an invention upon which the patent had expired are unrelated to the
use of an existing patent right, that under the patent laws the inven-
tion of an expired patent should be available for unrestricted exploita-
tion by everyone, and that the patent laws preclude a patentee from
extending or continuing the benefits of a patent monopoly beyond its
expiration.3 1 The court relied primarily on the authority of the
Supreme Court decision in the Scott Paper case, 3 2 wherein it was
held that the assignor of a patent is not estopped, by virtue of his
assignment, to defend a suit for infringement of the assigned patent
on the ground that the alleged infringing device is that of a prior art,
28. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
29. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 833,
834 (1950).
30. Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3rd Cir. 1962).
See also: Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F.
Supp. 1, 48 (D. Md. 1963), affirmed per curiam, 327 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1964).
31. See also: American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d
769, 777 (3rd Cir. 1959), wherein the court stated: "We conclude also, and quite
apart from all of the foregoing, that Paragraph 8(a) of Securit's Standard
Licensing Agreement which provides that that agreement shall continue in full
force and effect to the expiration of the last to expire of any of Securit's patents
set out in 'Schedule A' constitutes a patent misuse for it extends the payment of
royalties of patents under patents which may expire to the expiration date
of that patent most recently granted to Securit." But compare Well Surveys,
Incorporated v. McCullough Tool Company, 199 F. Supp. 374, 395 (N.D. Okla.
1961).
32. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
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expired patent. However, in other cases, including Thys Company v.
Brulotte,3 3 courts have rendered decisions directly contrary to the
decision in the Ar-Tik Systems case. Since the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Thys Company case on February 17,
1964, the conflict presented by the Ar-Tik Systems and Thys Company
cases may be ultimately resolved in the near future.
On the subject of grant-backs, the courts at the present time have
refused to declare either assignment-back provisions or license-back
provisions illegal per se, 34 and have condemned such conditions only
against the background of monopolistic practices and other illegal
restraints of trade. 3 5
Courts have approved specific grant-backs on the basis of one or
more of the following reasons: (a) the grant-backs were not employed
with the purpose or effect of violating the antitrust laws; (b) the
licensees were required to license-back only patents which could not
be exploited without risking infringement of the licensor's basic
patent; (c) the improvements gained by the licensor through grant-
backs were disseminated among all licensees without extra charge;
(d) no adverse effect on competition by the grant-backs was shown;
(e) the rights granted pursuant to the grant-back provisions did not
in fact enhance the licensor's power; (f) no one was refused a license
by the primary licensor.3 6
In view of the increasing attack on grant-backs, and because of
what might be termed increasing liberality in the construction of the
antitrust laws, it is doubtful that unlimited grant-backs, particularly
by assignment, will continue to escape judicial condemnation. Accord-
ingly, to minimize the risks in this area, the safest approach would
be to set up a grant-back in the form of a nonexclusive license cover-
ing subject matter no broader in scope than the subject matter of the
main license agreement.
33. Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) Para. 70981 (Wash. 1963). See
also: Ar-Tik Systems v. McCullough, 133 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. IlM. 1955); H-P-M De-
velopment Corporation v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906 (D. N.J. 1947).
34. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.)
Para. 71035 (E.D. Mich. 1964); International Nickel Company v. Ford Motor
Company, 166 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Modern Art Printing Co. v. Skeels,
123 F. Supp. 426 (D. N.J. 1954); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), affirmed on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
35. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.J. 1949);
United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
36. Supra note 34.
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Prior to 1952, the law with respect to tying arrangements im-
posed on manufacturing licensees was fairly well settled. Up to that
time it had been almost uniformly held that the tying together of the
grant of a patent license with the sale of supplies or components
required for practicing the licensed invention constituted not only a
misuse of the licensed patent, 37 but also in many cases a violation
of the antitrust laws. 3 8 Then, in 1952, section 271 was introduced
into the Patent Code. In view of this section and of several cases 3 9
concerned with its interpretation, a licensor may now engage in
limited practices that previously might have been regarded as pro-
hibited under the rationale of the pre-1952 tying cases. 4 0 The ques-
tion has arisen as to whether section 271 has created any exemptions
under the antitrust laws. Since section 271 does not refer to'the
antitrust laws and creates exemptions to the misuse doctrine only,
and if, as we have assumed, misuse is not equivalent to an antitrust
violation, it appears doubtful that this section serves to limit the
antitrust laws in their application to tying arrangements.
Two fairly recent cases offer a study of contrasts in connection
with tying arrangements. In Switzer Bros. v. Locklin,4 1 Switzer was
the owner of patents relating to the production of daylight fluorescent
devices and displays, and was also the owner of the trademark Day-
Glo used in marketing its fluorescent materials. Switzer licensed
(a) manufacturers of daylight fluorescent materials who would
market them exclusively under the Day-Glo mark, (b) dealers who
would handle Day-Glo materials exclusively and (c) end-use manufac-
turers, numbering more than 4000, who would use the Day-Glo mark
on all their devices. The material manufacturing licensees and dealer
licensees agreed to sell fluorescent materials only to other Switzer
licensees, and the dealer licensees and end-use manufacturing licensees
agreed to buy their materials only from Switzer or other sources
approved by Switzer. In connection with a patent infringement suit
37. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Leitch Manufacturing
Company v. Barber Company, 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
38. Mercoid Corporation v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661
(1944); Mercoid Corporation v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S.
680 (1944).
39. Calhoun v. State Chemical Manufacturing Company, 153 F. Supp. 293
(N.D. Ohio 1957); Sola Electric Co. v. General Electric Company, 146 F. Supp.
625 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
40. Certain tie-ins of components may be permissible provided the com-
ponents constitute a material part of the invention, are especially made or
especially adapted for use in the patented invention, and are not a staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (1952).
41. 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961).
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instituted by Switzer, the court found that Switzer's patents were
limited to certain end-use devices, that basic fluorescent materials had
substantial noninfringing uses and that Switzer's licensing program
was illegal because it fostered a Switzer monopoly in the daylight
fluorescent industry.
Although the second case, Dehydrating Process v. Smith,4 2 did not
concern restrictive licensing, it nevertheless is interesting because it
suggests one justification for tying arrangements. In this case, the
defendant was a manufacturer of storage equipment including a
patented glass lined silo and a patented unloading device. From 1951
through 1957, if requested, defendant sold its unloader separately
from its silo. Then, in 1958, because of complaints by half of the
customers who had purchased separate unloaders and installed them
unsatisfactorily with silos not manufactured by defendant, defend-
ant adopted a policy of not selling unloaders unless they were to be in-
stalled in presently purchased, or already owned silos of its own
manufacture. Pursuant to this policy, defendant refused to sell its un-
loaders to a contractor for installation with the latter's tanks under a
contract with the plaintiff. Plaintiff, in a treble damage action, al-
leged that such refusal to sell hampered its business operations and
that defendant's method of selling effected a tie-in violative of section
3 of the Clayton Act. A directed verdict in favor of the defendant at
the close of the evidence was affirmed on the. general basis that a
proper business reason-namely, a reduction of dissatisfied customers
-justified defendant's sales policy.
Having completed a review of the major restrictions imposed on
manufacturing licensees, we shall now consider the status of restric-
tions imposed on purchasers of patented articles. In a number of
cases, the Supreme Court has broadly stated that the first sale of a
patented commodity removes that commodity from the scope of the
patent grant. As an example, in the Univis Lens case, 43 the Univis
Lens Company assigned certain of its patents, purportedly covering
both the production and the finishing of lens blanks, to the Univis
Corporation. In return, the Lens Company was given a license, con-
ditioned on the payment of royalties, to manufacture and sell lens
blanks to other designated licensees of the corporation. Subsequently,
the corporation issued royalty free licenses to wholesalers permitting
them to purchase blanks from the Lens Company, to finish grinding
the blanks and to sell the finished lenses to licensed prescription re-
tailers at prices fixed by the corporation. The licensed prescription re-
tailers, at no royalty charge, were permitted to prescribe and fit lenses
42. 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961).
43. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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and to sell them to customers at prices prescribed by the corporation.
Royalty free licenses were also issued to finishing retailers permitting
them to purchase blanks from the Lens Company, to finish grinding
and mounting the blanks and to sell the finished lenses to customers
at prices prescribed by the corporation. When the validity of the de-
scribed licensing arrangement was challenged by the government,
the Supreme Court condemned, under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
all of the licenses, other than the initial one given to the Lens Com-
pany. The Court noted that the first vending of an article, whether in
its completed form or not, puts the article beyond the reach of the
patent monopoly.
If this principle were to be applied uniformly, all restrictions on
purchasers of patented articles would be outside the scope of the
patent grant. However, the law on such restrictions has not developed
so rigidly. In brief, it may be stated that certain restrictions on pur-
chasers, such as resale price maintenance 44 and tying agreements in-
volving supplies, 4 5 have clearly been held to be outside the scope of
the patent monopoly, while other restrictions, such as field of use re-
strictions 4 6 and use royalties, 4 7 have been held to be within the scope
of the patent right. The status of other restrictions on purchasers re-
mains unsettled.
Somewhat related to restrictive licensing is the problem of monopoli-
zation created by the acquisition of patent rights by one or more par-
ties pursuant to assignment or license agreements. In general, the
mere accumulation of patents is not in and of itself illegal, and this
principle has been applied to the accumulation of patents by a com-
pany on its own research.48  Correspondingly, simple unrestricted
patent pools, which are unlimited both in respect to the number of
participants and in respect to the rights accorded the participants,
44. Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8
(1918); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
45. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 397 (1947);
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492, 493 (1942); Motion Picture Patents
Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company, 243 U.S. 502, 512, 517
(1917).
46. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Company, 304 U.S.
175 (1938), on rehearing, 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938); Turner Glass Corporation v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49, 53 (7th Cir. 1949).
47. Cold Metal Process Co. v. McLouth Steel Corporation, 41 F. Supp. 487,
490 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Porter Needle Co. v.. National Needle Co., 17 F. 536 (D.
Mass. 1883).
48. Cole v. Hughes Tool Company, 215 F.2d 924, 934-937 (10th Cir. 1954);
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 211-214 (D.
Del. 1953), affirmed on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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have been approved by the courts.4 9 Additionally, in the absence of
other restrictive circumstances, it is permissible for the owners of the
pooled patents to charge a reasonable royalty for the use of such
patents.5 0
Aside from a wholly unrestricted patent pool, a pool may be re-
stricted in respect to the number of participants. An agreement for
such a closed pool is outside the scope of the patent laws and is some-
what analogous to an agreement among competitors not to do busi-
ness with a particular class of customers. Thus, several courts have
held closed pools to be violative of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 5 1
A pool that is not restricted in respect to the number of participants
but, instead, is restricted in respect to the rights accorded participants
is classifiable somewhere between an open pool and a closed pool.
Here, it seems clear that any restriction that cannot properly be im-
posed by a patent owner acting individually, cannot be imposed by a
group of patent owners. Resale price control would be in this cate-
gory. Restrictions that a patent owner acting individually may impose
on its licensees has a less settled status when imposed pursuant to a
pooling arrangement. These brief conclusions may be drawn. Price
control pursuant to a pooling arrangement not only is outside the
scope of the patent laws, but also is illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.5 2 On the other hand, simple field of operation re-
strictions have been sustained in several cases. 5 3 In general, the
validity of pooling restrictions depends upon the entire circumstances
surrounding the business dealings of the parties involved. 5 4
Three cases will serve to illustrate the manner in which the subject
of accumulation and group pooling of patents has been approached by
the courts. In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Company,5 5 the
complaint alleged that the defendants and co-conspirators had en-
gaged in a combination and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize, and
49. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Baker-Cammack
Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950).
50. Supra note 49.
51. Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo.
1956); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), affirmed per
curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957).
52. United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
53. Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corporation, 179 F.2d 80
(9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry and Machine Company,
139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1956). Compare, United States v. Associated Patents,
Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955), affirmed per curiam, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
54. Hartford-Empire Company v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
55. 375 U.S. 174 (1963).
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that the defendant had attempted to monopolize interstate and foreign
trade and commerce in the importation, sale and distribution of house-
hold automatic zigzag sewing machines in violation of sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. According to the evidence relied on by the
government, the defendant during a period of about three years: pur-
chased a United States patent; entered into separate nonaggression
cross license agreements with an Italian corporation, a Swiss corpora-
tion and a German corporation; acquired patent applications from
the Swiss and German corporations; filed a complaint before the
United States Tariff Commission seeking to exclude the importation of
certain machines covered by the claims of one of its patents; and in-
stituted four infringement suits based on domestic sales of machines
imported from Japan. In view of these activities, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant had violated the Sherman Act. The Court re-
fused to accept the district court's findings that defendant was not a
party to an unlawful conspiracy, and that defendant's acquisition of
patent rights was motivated by a legitimate desire to protect its own
commercial models of zigzag sewing machines through the resolution
of conflicting rights of others.
In the Kobe v. Dempsey case,5 6 the plaintiffs filed suit for infringe-
ment of several patents relating to hydraulic pumps for oil wells. The
court found the following: the plaintiffs had cornered the hydraulic
pump business for oil wells; that every important patent which was
issued relating to this field found its way into the plaintiffs' pool; that
no other such pump was manufactured by anyone other than one of
the plaintiffs until defendants marketed one; and that the suit for
infringement against the defendants was part of the plaintiffs' plan to
maintain a monopoly position. On the basis of these findings, the
plaintiffs were held guilty of unlawful monopolization and defendants
were awarded treble damages.
Although simple field of operation restrictions have generally been
upheld, it should be borne in mind that such restrictions have been
condemned when part of an overall plan or program to restrain or
monopolize trade. The Hartford-Empire case 5 7 is a leading illustration
of this principle. Over a period of years, ostensibly in settlement of
56. Kobe Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952). See
also: United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
57. Hartford-Empire Company v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). See
also: United States v. Associated Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1955),
affirmed per curiam, 350 U.S. 960 (1956); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tat-
nail Measuring Systems Company, 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1958), affirmed, 268
F.2d 395 (3rd Cir. 1959). But compare: Cutter Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryo-
chem Corporation, 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Birdsboro Steel
Foundry and Machine Company, 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
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various interferences and litigation, and pursuant to cross license
agreements, a group of manufacturers of glassware and of machinery
for making glassware pooled most of the important patents in the
glassware industry. The participating manufacturing licensees also
allocated fields of manufacture among themselves. Thus, one company
had exclusive rights in the non-container field, another company had
exclusive rights to manufacture milk bottles, other companies had
limited rights to manufacture fruit jars and still other companies had
limited rights to manufacture machinery.
The District Court found that invention of glass-making ma-
chinery had been discouraged, that competition in the manu-
facture and sale or licensing of such machinery had been
suppressed, and that the system of restricted licensing had
been employed to suppress competition in the manufacture
of unpatented glassware and to maintain prices of the manu-
factured products. 58
Accordingly, the general arrangement was found to violate sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.5 9
In respect to the accumulation of patent rights pursuant to assign-
ment or license agreements, section 7 of the Clayton Act must not be
overlooked. This section provides, in part, that no corporation shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition or to tend to create a monopoly. In the related field of
copyrights, the court held in United States v. Columbia Pictures
60
that the licensee under an exclusive long-term license distribution
arrangement concerning copyrighted films for television exhibition
acquired a part of the licensor's assets within the meaning of sec-
tion 7. The court noted that the words "acquire" and "assets" are
"generic, imprecise terms encompassing a broad spectrum of trans-
actions whereby the acquiring person may accomplish the acquisi-
tion by means of purchase, assignment, lease, license, or otherwise."
58. Hartford-Empire Company v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 400 (1945).
59. In a later case, restrictions on the use of leased glass making machinery
were upheld on the basis that they were neither inherently illegal nor part of the
conspiracy condemned in the government's case against the Hartford-Empire
Company. Turner Glass Corporation v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th
Cir. 1949).
60. 189 F. Supp. 153, 181-183 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also: Smith-Corona
Marchant Inc. v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1963
Trade Cas.) Para. 40718 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Lever Brothers Inc.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1963 Trade Cas.) Para. 70770 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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In either drafting or reviewing restrictive patent license agree-
ments, one further principle should be borne in mind. Under ordinary
circumstances, a licensee is estopped to deny the validity of the
patent under which he is licensed. However, an exception to this
estoppel rule has arisen in cases involving antitrust issues. For ex-
ample, when a price fixing restriction, which in the absence of patent
protection is illegal per se, is embodied in a patent license agreement,
the doctrine is now established that the licensee may challenge the
validity of the licensed patent in an effort to demonstrate that the
price provision is illegal because not justified by a valid patent. 6 1
Although this doctrine has been primarily confined to price control
licenses, there is no fundamental reason why it may not be extended
to other types of restrictive licenses in the future. In this connection,
it is well to note that the Supreme Court has indicated in the Gypsum
case6 2 that the government can, in an antitrust proceeding, attack
the validity of the patents of the defendant. Such attack presumably
would be for the purpose of showing the lack of patent justification
for the otherwise illegal activities of the defendant.
So far we have reviewed representative restrictions and conditions
,primarily imposed on licensees. The focus of attention will now be
shifted to various agreements or covenants made by a licensor for
the benefit of his licensee. There are two areas which especially war-
rant consideration.
First, any agreement by a licensor that he will not deal with or
promote products or processes that are competitive to his licensed in-
vention, unless restricted to products or processes covered by the
licensed patent, is wholly outside the scope of the patent grant. Such
a provision prevents the licensor from dealing with unpatented com-
peting goods or processes and patented competing goods or processes
not covered by the licensed patent. Since this restriction benefits
solely the licensee through the complete elimination of the competi-
tion of the licensor, and because the licensee is not entitled to such
protection under the licensor's patent, no justification for this practice
can be found in the patent laws. Accordingly, the courts have viewed
agreements of this type with extreme disfavor.
6 3
The second type of restriction imposed on a licensor that has been
running into some difficulty is the granting of a license accompanied
61. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); McGregor
v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947); Edward Katzinger Co.
v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
62. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 386-388 (1948).
63. McCullough v. Kammerer Corporation, 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948);
Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corporation, 150 F. Supp. 384 (E. D. Wis. 1957).
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by a covenant by the licensor that he will not grant other licenses
without the consent of the immediate licensee. Under this arrange-
ment, an applicant for a license must obtain the consent of two parties
-the licensor and his immediate licensee. Applicable here is the
general principle that although a patent owner acting alone may
refuse to license anyone, he cannot refuse to grant a license when
the refusal is pursuant to a conspiracy or combination. 6 4 On the basis
of this principle, the noted covenant is objectionable. Although it
has been argued that a limited exclusive license of the character
described has a less severe effect on competition than an absolute
exclusive license, several courts have expressed the view that this
type of restriction on the licensor-a veto power by the licensee-is
illegal. 65
At this point, we shall take notice of two principal forms of anti-
trust remedies that are peculiar to patent-antitrust cases. One is com-
pulsory licensing of patents and the other is compulsory sale of
patented devices.
Although there is no general statutory authority for compulsory
licensing, many courts in antitrust cases have ordered compulsory
licensing of patents at a reasonable royalty. The circumstances under
which compulsory licensing is appropriate are outlined in consider-
able detail in the Imperial Chemical case. 6 6 With respect to the
issue of whether dedication or compulsory royalty free licensing may
be properly ordered in a patent-antitrust case, the Supreme Court left
the matter open in the National Lead case 6 7 for future consideration
in other cases. As one might expect, this indefinite position of the
Supreme Court has created a diversity of opinion among the lower
courts on this question.6
64. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States
v. L. D. Caulk Company, 126 F. Supp. 693 (D. Del. 1954).
65. United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956), affirmed
per curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957); United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304
(E.D. Mich. 1951), affirmed, 343 U.S. 444 (1952). But compare: Henricksen v.
Cory Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.) Para. 71007 (7th Cir. 1964);
Benger Laboratories Limited v. R. K. Laros Company, 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), affirmed per curiam, 317 F.2d 455 (3rd Cir. 1963); Watson v. Heil, 97
USPQ 339 (D. Md. 1953); United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805,
809 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
66. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). See also: United States v. The Singer Manufacturing Co., Trade Reg. Rep.
(1964 Trade Cas.) Para. 71133 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
67. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338, 347-349 (1947).
68. United States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D. N.J. 1953);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, 61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945).
1964]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
When a patent owner who has leased rather than sold his patented
devices is found guilty of violating the antitrust laws, a number of
courts have adopted the further remedy of compulsory selling as an
appropriate remedy for restoring competitive conditions in the in-
dustry. 6 1)
On the basis of public policy considerations, courts have also con-
cerned themselves with the background of patent interference settle-
ment agreements. For example, in Precision Co. v. Automotive Co.,
7 ) one Zimmerman while employed by Automotive developed a torque
wrench upon which a patent application was filed. A co-employee of
Zimmerman, who was fully acquainted with the latter's torque
wrenches, secretly collaborated with an outsider by the name of Lar-
son in developing a new wrench. Then, Larson filed a patent applica-
tion on the newly developed wrench, and Larson and others organized
Precision Co. to manufacture the wrenches. When certain of the
claims of the two Zimmerman and Larson applications became in-
volved in an interference in the Patent Office, Larson falsely swore as
to the date of conception and other dates set forth in his preliminary
statement so as to antedate Zimmerman's invention. Larson's collab-
orator, due to dissatisfaction with the course of events, met with
representatives of Automotive, claimed that he had developed Lar-
son's wrench and disclosed the foregoing circumstances under oath.
This evidence was reviewed separately with two disinterested attor-
neys who advised, in effect, that it was insufficient to bring to the at-
tention of either the Patent Office or the District Attorney. Subse-
quently, pursuant to settlement agreements, Larson conceded priority
in Zimmerman. Larson's application was assigned to Automotive,
which in turn granted Precision a limited license to complete certain
unfilled orders for wrenches. Then Larson, Precision and its major
customer acknowledged the validity of the claims of the patents to
issue on the Larson and Zimmerman applications. Thereafter, when
Precision began to manufacture a new wrench, Automotive filed suit
claiming that this was an infringement of its patents received on the
Larson and Zimmerman applications and a breach of the interference
settlement agreements. The Supreme Court held that Automotive had
unclean hands and thus was not entitled to relief. As noted by the
court,
Instead of doing all within its power to reveal and expose
[Larson's] fraud, [Automotive improperly] procured an out-
69. Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952);
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), affirmed per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
70. Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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side settlement of the interference proceedings, acquired the
Larson application itself, turned it into a patent and barred
the other parties from even questioning its validity. 7 1
Similarly, the legislature has addressed itself to the problem of in-
terference settlement agreements. A recent amendment to the Patent
Code provides that agreements settling patent interference proceed-
ings must be filed in the Patent Office. 7 2 The Commissioner of Patents
is obligated to notify the parties to an interference of this filing re-
quirement, and settlement agreements normally must be filed before
the termination of the interference. Upon request of any party filing
such agreement, the copy will be made available only to government
agencies on written request or to other parties on a showing of good
cause. The failure to file a copy of such agreement renders the agree-
ment and the patent involved permanently unenforceable. The pur-
pose of this legislation is to publicize interference settlement agree-
ments so as to reduce or eliminate the incorporation of restrictive pro-
visions therein and help prevent the use of the agreements as a means
of violating the antitrust laws.
The final topic for consideration concerns techniques and related
problems of correcting or purging illegal license arrangements. A find-
ing that a patent owner has misused his patent by granting improper
restrictive licenses or by other improper conduct does not operate to
invalidate the patent, 7 3 nor does it forever foreclose the owner from
enforcing the patent. As indicated by the Supreme Court in the
Morton Salt case, full rights to enforce a patent that has been mis-
used may be reinstated when it can be shown "that the improper prac-
71. As to Automotive's contention that it did not have absolute proof of
fraud, the court stated:
Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are
parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to
report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness under-
lying the applications in issue ... This duty is not excused by reasonable
doubts as to the sufficiency of the proof of the inequitable conduct nor by
resort to independent legal advice. Public interest demands that all facts
relevant to such matters be submitted formally or informally to the
Patent Office, which can then pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence.
Id. at p. 818.
Compare: Campbell v. Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947).
72. Title 35, U.S. Code, Sec. 135 (c), as added by P. L. 87-831, October 15,
1962, 76 Stat. 958.
73. Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Dennis, 166 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1948); Novadel-
Agene Corporation v. Penn, 119 F.2d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 1941); Harvey v. Levine,
204 F. Supp. 947, 959 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 139 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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tice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of
the patent have been dissipated. ' 7 4
Thus, upon effective elimination of an illegal provision in a license
agreement or upon cessation of other improper practices, and after
dissipation of the consequences of the misuse, the patent owner may
again enforce the license agreement or the patent involved. 7 5 How-
ever, upon reinstatement of a patent owner's rights, recovery can be
had only for acts of infringement occurring thereafter and not for
acts of infringement that had occurred during the period of misuse.7 6
Similarly, royalties accruing during the period of existence of an il-
legal license arrangement cannot be recovered.7 7 Also, in several anti-
trust decrees, defendants have been enjoined from prosecuting all
suits for past infringement or past royalties due. 7 8
The correction or alteration of an illegal license arrangement or
other improper practice should be effected at the earliest possible time.
Of course, a propitious time to do so is before suit is brought by or
against the patent owner in connection with a license arrangement or
patent involved in misuse. However, corrective action may be taken
at almost any time. Courts have undertaken to examine changes in
a patent owner's licensing program or method of doing business even
though such changes were made after suit was filed but before trial,7 9
or during the progress of the trial,8 0 or in supplemental proceedings
74. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492, 493 (1942).
75. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 473
(1957); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
76. Eastern Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 F.2d 247, 254 (4th
Cir. 1951); Sylvania Industrial Corporation v. Visking Corporation, 132 F.2d 947,
959 (4th Cir. 1943); Novadel-Agene Corporation v. Penn, 119 F.2d 764, 767 (5th
Cir. 1941); American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 42 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill.
1941).
77. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465
(1957); Park-In Theatres v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 90 F. Supp. 730, 735
(D. Del. 1950), affirmed per curiam, 185 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1950).
78. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945); United
States v. General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D. N.J. 1953); United States v.
National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), affirmed, 332 U.S. 319
(1947).
79. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir.
1950); Air Products v. Boston Metals Co., 98 F. Supp. 719, 729 (D. Md. 1951);
Hoague-Sprague Corporation v. Bird & Son, 91 F. Supp. 159 (D. Mass. 1950).
80. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 181 (1931); White Cap
Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 203 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 1953); Campbell v.
Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947); Universal Sewer Pipe Corp. v. General
Construction Company, 42 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
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following a trial court decision8 l or during appeal proceedings.8 2
For example, in Sylvania v. Visking,8 3 action was brought by Visking
for infringement of four patents. In a district court opinion dated
April 3, 1941, Visking was found to have misused its patents. There-
after, Visking cancelled all restrictive licenses and on June 27, 1941,
instituted supplemental proceedings. On reopening the case, the dis-
trict court held that Visking had purged itself of misuse by May 12,
1941, and was thus entitled to an injunction against future infringe-
ment of its patents and an accounting from the date of purge for
past infringement. As another example, in Flexwood v. Faussner,8 4
thirteen days after the date of oral argument before the Court of Ap-
peals, the plaintiffs filed an amended agreement removing certain con-
tested clauses. The court stated:
We see no reason why we should not consider the new con-
tract. We understand that a reviewing court may always con-
sider evidence presented to it that shows a case has become
moot or that a cause of action or a defense has ceased to
exist. This principle should certainly be applicable to a de-
fense not presented to a trial court and presented for the first
time to the reviewing court.
Changes in licensing provisions are usually initiated by the patent
owner but occasionally are made pursuant to the directions of a
court. 8 5
Abandonment of an improper licensing program may be accom-
plished by cancelling objectionable clauses,8 6 by cancelling objec-
tionable agreementsS7 or by offering unrestricted licenses.8 8 Public
announcements to the trade of future unrestricted dealings have also
81. Sylvania Industrial Corporation v. Visking Corporation, 132 F.2d 947
(4th Cir. 1943).
82. Flexwood Co. v. Faussner & Co., 145 F.2d 528, 542 (7th Cir. 1944).
83. Supra note 81.
84. Supra note 82.
85. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 181 (1931); Eastern
Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 F.2d 247, 252 (4th Cir. 1951).
86. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 181 (1931); Campbell
v. Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947); Flexwood Co. v. Faussner & Co., 145
F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1944).
87. Sylvania Industrial Corporation v. Visking Corporation, 132 F.2d 947
(4th Cir. 1943); Metals Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 228 F.2d 885,
889 (3rd Cir. 1958); Philad Co. v. Master Hair Shoppe, Inc., 53 USPQ 243 (N.D.
Ohio 1942).
88. Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., 181 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1950).
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been viewed by the courts as evidence of abandonment.8 9 In Well
Surveys v. McCullough,9 0 a complete purge of previously existing
patent abuses was accomplished when the plaintiff amended its
standard forms of license agreement to remove objectionable pro-
visions, published notice advising the public that it was prepared to
license any or all of its patents on reasonable terms and wrote letters
to all of its existing licensees offering termination of existing agree-
ments and the negotiation of new agreements on reasonable terms.
However, not all revised licensing programs have been deemed suffici-
ent to rectify prior illegal practices. For example, the offer of a
license requiring the licensee to pay damages for alleged prior in-
fringement, 9 1 and the mere offer of alternative licenses which are
less desirable from a royalty standpoint than concurrent restrictive
licenses,"112 have been disapproved.
A complete purge involves not only abandonment of the improper
practice but also dissipation of the consequences of the misuse. The
issue of whether a misuse has been purged is essentially a question of
fact.9 3 In most cases, once it has been shown that an illegal licensing
arrangement has been cancelled and that improper operations under
the arrangement have in fact been discontinued, the courts find that
the consequences of the misuse ended with the cancellation.9 4 Corre-
spondingly, although the application of the misuse doctrine is not
avoided merely because a restrictive provision in a patent agreement
89. Preformed Line Products Co., v. Fanner Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1964
Trade Cas.) Para. 71051 (N.D. Ohio 1962), affirmed, Trade Reg. Rep. (1964
Trade Cas.) Para. 71026 (6th Cir. 1964); Well Surveys, Incorporated v. McCul-
lough Tool Company, 199 F. Supp. 374, 395 (N.D. Okla. 1961): Universal Sewer
Pipe Corp. v. General Construction Company, 42 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
90. Supra note 89.
91. American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 42 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1941),
affirmed on other grounds, 128 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1942).
92. National Foam System v. Urquhart, 202 F.2d 659 (3rd Cir. 1953); Dehy-
drators, Limited v. Petrolite Corporation, Limited, 117 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1941);
Barber Asphalt Corporation v. LaFera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F.2d 211 (3rd
Cir. 1940). See also: American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corporation,
154 F. Supp. 890 (D. Del. 1957), further proceedings, 166 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del.
1958), affirmed, 268 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1959).
93. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465
(1957).
94. Metals Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 228 F.2d 885, 889
(3rd Cir. 1956); Eastern Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 F.2d 247, 252
(4th Cir. 1951); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog Electric Products Co.,
179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950); Sylvania Industrial Corporation v. Visking
Corporation, 132 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1943). See also: White Cap Company v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, 203 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1953); Air Products v.
Boston Metals Co., 98 F. Supp. 719, 729 (D. Md. 1951).
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has not been enforced, 9 5 the mere cancellation of such a provision is
effective in completing a purge since there are no consequences to be
dissipated. 9 6 However, when an illegal arrangement has been en-
forced and has permitted the parties to gain a competitive position
that they would not have otherwise enjoyed, the mere cancellation of
the arrangement will not suffice to remove the consequences of
misuse. 9 7 Sufficient time must elapse following cancellation to permit
restoration of normal competitive conditions. 9 8
In connection with unilateral cancellation of illegal provisions or
agreements, several diverse contract principles have been followed by
the courts. Generally speaking, a provision of an agreement may be
unilaterally cancelled or waived by the party for whose benefit the
provision was incorporated. 9 9 Thus, it has been held that a licensor
may purge its licenses by unilaterally cancelling price maintenance
provisions which were inserted for the licensor's benefit. 100 However,
where a price fixing provision was embodied in a patent license
agreement at the request of the licensee, one court decided that the
provision could not be unilaterally removed by the licensor.' 0 1 In
another series of related cases involving a price fixing provision in
a patent license agreement, an attempt by the licensor to delete the
provision was refused recognition by the licensee. A request by the
licensee for reformation of the agreement and a refund of royalties
was denied by the courts for the reason that the parties were found
to be in pari delicto and thus not entitled to assistance by the
courts, 1 0 2 and the agreement was ultimately declared null and void
as against public policy. 10 3
95. United Shoe Machinery Corporation v. United States, 258 U.S. 451,
458 (1922); F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 226 F.2d 373, 376 (3rd
Cir. 1955).
96. Campbell v. Mueller, 159 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1947).
97. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945); United
States v. General Instrument Corporation, 87 F. Supp. 157, 195 (D. N.J. 1949).
See also: A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 52 F. Supp. 566 (D. Conn. 1943).
98. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 473
(1957).
99. Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827, 834-836 (1950).
100. Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Bulldog Electric Products Co.,
179 F.2d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 1950).
101. National Transformer Corp. v. France Manufacturing Co., 215 F.2d
343 (6th Cir. 1954).
102. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Metals Disintegrating Co., 176 F.2d 90 (3rd
Cir. 1949).
103. Metals Disintegrating Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 228 F.2d 885, 889
(3rd Cir. 1956).
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As a general proposition under the pari delicto doctrine the law
will leave parties to an illegal contract where it finds them. However,
one who becomes a party to an illegal scheme as a result of economic
coercion is usually not considered in pari delicto, and courts are re-
luctant to invoke the pari delicto doctrine if it will work an injustice.
The problems involved in an attempted unilateral cancellation of
an agreement having an illegal provision are illustrated in the
Culligan case. 104 Culligan had entered into a number of franchise
agreements each of which obligated the dealer to purchase its full re-
quirements for specified equipment and materials from Culligan and
assigned the dealer a designated exclusive sales area. Then, as the
result of a complaint brought under section 3 of the Clayton Act,
Culligan entered into a consent settlement with the Federal Trade
Commission and agreed to terminate all exclusive dealing arrange-
ments. Thereafter, Culligan notified its dealers that the consent order
"by its nature invalidated all Culligan franchises" and offered a new
form of franchise agreement for nonexclusive territories. The
dealers who refused to sign the new agreements were informed that
their existing agreements were cancelled, that Culligan would no
longer sell its products to them and that they should discontinue the
use of the Culligan name in their businesses. Several dealers brought
a declaratory judgment action. The district court resolved all issues
in favor of the dealers and issued an injunction restraining Culligan
from interfering with the rights of the dealers in their franchise
agreements. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the illegal
provisions of the original agreements were severable because they
were not illegal per se, that the original agreements less the require-
ments provisions did not lack consideration or mutuality because the
dealers had invested large sums of money in business conducted under
the Culligan name and had commitments to advertise Culligan
products for considerable periods in the future and that to invoke the
doctrine of pari delicto would work an injustice on the dealers.
The subject of antitrust, misuse and public policy principles as
they relate to patents and patent agreements is quite broad. Although
all ramifications of this subject have not been covered, it is believed
that the foregoing presentation will provide an understanding of the
fundamental concepts involved.
104. Beloit Culligan Soft Water Service Inc. v. Culligan, Inc., 274 F.2d 29
(7th Cir. 1960).
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APPENDIX
The substantive provisions of the Sherman Act that concern patent
activities appear, in part, as follows:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal ....
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
The main substantive provisions of the Clayton Act that affect
patent activity read, in part, as follows:
Sec. 3.... it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
[interstate] commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or re-
sale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price
charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such
price, on the condition, agreement or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodi-
ties of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale on
such condition, agreement or understanding may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce.
Sec. 7.... no corporation engaged in [interstate] com-
merce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
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